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afforded the ability to exercise shareholder voting rights and prevent a company from filing for 
bankruptcy. 
Courts have recognized two central ways in which a creditor/shareholder attempts to 
block a company from filing for bankruptcy: (1) a golden share, and (2) blocking provisions. A 
golden share is a “share that controls more than half of the corporation voting rights and gives 
the shareholder veto power over changes to the company charter.”4 The term blocking provision 
“is a catch-all to refer to various contractual provisions through which a creditor reserves a right 
to prevent a debtor from filing for bankruptcy.”5 Ultimately, both golden shares and blocking 
provisions give a creditor/shareholder the ability to prevent a company with which they do 
business from entering into bankruptcy, eliminating the possibility of having their claims 
discharged.6  
Part I of this memorandum discusses whether a creditor/shareholder may use its 
shareholder voting power to prevent a company from entering bankruptcy, while analyzing the 
difficulty courts have with uniformly deciding the issue. Part II of this memorandum examines 
the conclusion of many courts, that from a policy standpoint, when a party is both a shareholder 
and creditor, it should not have the ability to prevent a company from filing for bankruptcy.   
Discussion 
I. Different Interpretations 
It is well established that companies are able to voluntarily file for bankruptcy.7 
However, a company may not file a bankruptcy petition without the requisite authority.8 
                                                
4 See In re Franchise Services, 891 F.3d at 205. 
5 Id. 
6 Id. 
7 11 U.S.C. § 301 
8 See Price v. Gurney, 324 U.S. 100, 106 (1945); see also In re N2N Commerce, Inc., 405 B.R. 34, 41 (Bankr. D. 
Mass. 2009) (“It is well-settled that a bankruptcy filing is a specific act requiring specific authorization.”). 
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Authority to file a bankruptcy petition “must be found in the instruments of the corporation and 
applicable state law.”9 A company is free to place the requisite authority governing their ability 
to file bankruptcy in their instruments of incorporation.10 Despite this freedom, it is generally 
accepted that a company may not waive its rights to the benefits of bankruptcy prepetition.11 
Thus, preprepetition agreements purporting to interfere with a debtor’s rights under the 
Bankruptcy Code are not enforceable.12 Ultimately, courts must ask whether or not the actions of 
the party blocking the bankruptcy from going forward constitute an impermissible prevention of 
the debtor’s ability to file for bankruptcy.  
A. “Bankruptcy-Proof Provisions” that Violate the Bankruptcy Code 
i. Golden Share 
A golden share is a token equity unit that is contracted for by a creditor, granting the 
creditor voting control over a company’s ability to file for bankruptcy.13 Courts invalidate golden 
shares by stressing that business entities have a right to file for bankruptcy.14 In In Re 
Intervention Energy, the court rooted its analysis of the parties’ actions on the premise that “the 
Bankruptcy Code preempts the private right to contract around its essential provisions.”15 There, 
the parties entered into a contract prescribing that the lender would receive a “common unit” of 
the company in exchange for forbearance of his loan.16 Along with the common unit, the 
company agreed to amend its LLC agreement, requiring the consent of all holders of common 
                                                
9 116 B.R. 775, 778 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1990). 
10 See Wank v. Gordon, 505 B.R. 878, 887 (9th Cir. BAP 2014). 
11 Id. 
12 See generally In re Intervention Energy Holdings, 553 B.R. 258, 263 (D. Del. 2016); see Wank, 505 B.R. at 887 
(stating that a debtor may not waive its rights to the benefits of bankruptcy in a prepetition waiver). 
13 See In re Intervention Energy, 553 B.R. at 264. 
14 Id. at 263 (“[I]t is axiomatic that a debtor may not contract away the right to discharge in bankruptcy.”). 
15 Id. at 263. 
16 Id. at 261. 
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units prior to filing for bankruptcy.17 Since a negative vote could essentially prevent a 
bankruptcy from occurring, the court concluded that this was a clear example of a “blocking” 
(golden) share, and “an attempt to contract away the right to seek bankruptcy relief.”18  
ii. Blocking Provisions 
A blocking provision is a contractual provision in which a creditor limits a company’s 
right to seek bankruptcy relief as a condition of supplying credit.19 Essentially such a provision 
constitutes a prepetition waiver of a company’s right to file for bankruptcy.20 An example of a 
court invalidating a creditor/shareholder’s attempt to prevent a bankruptcy in the form of a 
blocking provision can be seen in In re Bay Club Partners.21 There, the debtor company entered 
into an operating agreement stating that the company was unable to initiate an insolvency 
proceeding until such a time that the lender was paid off in full.22 Despite the language being 
consistent with Oregon State LLC law, the Court deemed the issue a matter of federal law, 
rejecting the provision as a “maneuver of an ‘astute creditor’ to preclude [company] from 
availing itself of the protections of the Bankruptcy Code prepetition.”23  
iii. Blocking Directors 
Finally, a third heavily scrutinized creditor attempt at avoiding the bankruptcy process is 
the “blocking director.”24 Blocking directors sit on the boards of companies established by 
creditors.25 These companies have few operations and generally only do business with one 
                                                
17 Id. 
18 Id. at 264; See also In re Franchise Services, 891 F.3d at 205 (specifically acknowledging golden shares in the 
context of corporations, as well as LLC’s). 
19 See In re Squire Court Partners, 574 B.R. 701, 707 (E.D. Ark. 2017). 
20 Id. 
21 In re Bay Club Partners-472, LLC, No. 14-30394-rld11, 2014 WL 1796688 (D. Or. 2014). 
22 Id at *3. 
23 Id. at *5. 




particular creditor.26 The key to the blocking director’s power is that the company needs 
unanimous consent from its director’s to file for bankruptcy.27 This business structure allows 
“one specific director, chosen by the secured creditor, [to] withhold its vote and thus block . . .  a 
voluntary bankruptcy petition.”28 Because the company has little operations an involuntary 
bankruptcy petition is just as unlikely.29 
The court in In re Lake Michigan, struck down a blocking director provision when it was 
established by the debtor that the creditor’s appointed board member violated his fiduciary duties 
by failing to consider the interest of the company, solely relying on his own interests.30 The court 
implied that a blocking director provision can only ever be valid if the director adheres to his 
fiduciary duties; absent that, as was the case here, the blocking provision is void.31 Similarly, the 
court in In Re Lexington Hospital Group, LLC, struck down an “independent manager” provision 
because the manager had no fiduciary duties to the company that might limit self-interested 
decisions.32 Ultimately these cases are examples that when an agreement clearly attempts to take 
away a potential debtor’s right to file for bankruptcy, the court will find the agreement void. 
B. Provisions that Do Not Violate the Bankruptcy Code 
i. Minority Approach 
In 2018, the Fifth Circuit in In re Franchise Services, took a different approach than the 
cases cited above, declaring that “there is no prohibition in federal bankruptcy law against 
                                                
26 Id. at 911. 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id.; An Involuntary bankruptcy proceeding can be brought by either a single qualifying creditor if the debtor has 
less than 12 creditors, or by 3 or more qualifying creditors if the debtor has more than 12 creditors. See 11 U.S.C. § 
303 
30 Id. at 913. 
31 Id. at 914 (“The essential playbook for a successful blocking director structure” requires normal director fiduciary 
duties.”). 
32 In re Lexington Hospital Group, LLC, 577 B.R. 676, 686 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. 2017). 
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granting a preferred shareholder the right to prevent a voluntary bankruptcy filing just because 
the shareholder also happens to be an unsecured creditor.”33 There, the court avoided the 
negative connotation of golden shares and blocking provisions, by determining that the 
shareholder consent provision present constituted neither.34 The court seemingly centered its 
determination on the fact that there was no evidence of bad faith when the creditor took an equity 
stake in the company in exchange for forbearance.35 Ultimately the Fifth Circuit kept the door 
open for future creditor/shareholders to prevent a company from filing bankruptcy holding 
“federal bankruptcy law does not prevent a bona fide equity holder from exercising its voting 
rights to prevent the corporation from filing a voluntary bankruptcy petition just because it also 
holds a debt owed by the corporation and owes no fiduciary duty to the corporation or its fellow 
shareholders.”36  
Other courts have also found contracted for operating agreement clauses prohibiting 
bankruptcy without the consent of all parties to be permissible. The Southern District of 
Georgina in In re Global Ship Systems, LLC, answered the question of whether a 
creditor/shareholder could prevent a bankruptcy by finding that a creditor/shareholder “wears 
two hats.”37 To this extent, the court separated the creditor/shareholder’s roles, stating that a 
shareholder’s right in the LLC Agreement to “prevent a bankruptcy filing to which it does not 
consent is dependent solely on its status as an equity holder.”38 In concluding that the 
creditor/shareholder retained his equity right to prevent a bankruptcy case, the court deferred to 
                                                
33 In re Franchise Services, 891 F.3d at 208. 
34 Id. at 205. 
35 Id. at 209. 
36 Id. 
37 In re Global Ship Systems, LLC, 391 B.R. 193, 203 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 2007). 
38 Id. at 200. 
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Georgia’s legislative determination that LLC’s should be granted broad in the discretion and 
management of their affairs.39  
ii. General Partners & Managing Members 
Courts have upheld bankruptcy filing restrictions when the party preventing the filing is a 
general partner in a partnership or managing member in an LLC.40 In In re Squire, the court 
described the unique circumstances of this situation, stating:  
“it is one thing to look past corporate governance documents and the structure of a 
corporation when a creditor has negotiated authority to veto a debtor’s decision to file a 
bankruptcy petition; it is quite another to ignore those documents when the owners retain 
for themselves the decision whether to file bankruptcy.”41  
 
Similarly, in In re DB Capital Holdings, the court found that there was no support “for 
the proposition that members of an LLC cannot agree among themselves not to file 
bankruptcy.”42 These courts placed great emphasis on the fact that partners and managing 
members have strong, contracted for, ownership rights in their respective companies.43 The court 
in In re DB Capital Holdings, placed very little emphasis on the arguments of the pro-bankruptcy 
party, who alleged that the company’s managing member only voted against the bankruptcy 
filing in support of, and for the benefit of, the debtor’s main secured creditor.44  
II. Allowing Creditor/Shareholders to prevent a company from filing for bankruptcy is 
against public policy. 
 
When analyzing the policy rationale behind preventing or allowing a creditor/shareholder 
party to prevent a potential debtor from filing bankruptcy, two conflicting concepts must be 
balanced: (1) the fact that the Bankruptcy Code is premised on the idea of a fresh start, against 
                                                
39 Id. at 204. 
40 See generally In re Squire Court Partners, 574 B.R. 701 (E.D. Ark. 2017); In re DB Capital Holdings, LLC, 463 
B.R. 142 (B.A.P. 10th Cir. 2017). 
41 In re Squire, 574 B.R. at 708. 
42 In re DB Capital Holdings, 463 B.R. at *3. 
43 See In re Squire, 574 B.R. at 709. 
44 In re DB Capital Holdings, 463 B.R. at *3. 
American	Bankruptcy	Institute	Law	Review	|	St.	John’s	School	of	Law,	8000	Utopia	Parkway,	Queens,	NY	11439	 
 
(2) the idea that bankruptcy proof provisions are legitimate contractual arrangements between 
two well informed and educated business parties.  First, Congress made it “a central part of the 
bankruptcy code to give debtors a fresh start in life and a clear field for future effort unburdened 
by the existence of old debts.”45 This idea governs a majority of the Bankruptcy Code, and thus 
courts have held that it is “against public policy for a debtor to waive the prepetition protection 
of the Bankruptcy Code.”46 Second, when courts have stressed the importance of recognizing 
legitimate contractual agreements between parties, which prevent a bankruptcy, those courts 
have analyzed the agreements made by equity holders, not creditors.47 The court in Squire stated 
that “allowing a creditor to contract for control of a debtor's decision whether to file a bankruptcy 
petition would undermine the most fundamental purposes of the bankruptcy. The limited 
partners, however, are owners, not creditors [of the corporation].”48  
Seemingly, the crux of the Squire court’s reasoning, is that in Squire, the bankruptcy 
preventing party was simply an equity holder, not a creditor.49 Thus, the Squire court implied 
that its reasoning would not apply when a creditor accepts equity in lieu of repayment or a lower 
interest rate because allowing a creditor to control a company’s bankruptcy filing would 
“undermine the most fundamental purpose of bankruptcy.”50 In a situation where equity is 
exchanged in return for repayment, similar to In re Franchise Services, the idea that two parties 
were smart businessmen operating under their own volition needs to be weighed against the 
potential abuse that may result.51 If creditors knew that they had the ability to ensure they would 
                                                
45 In re Bogdanovich, 292 F.3d 104, 107 (2d Cir. 2002). 
46 See Bank of China v. Huang, 275 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2002). 
47 See generally In re Squire, 574 B.R. 701; In re DB Capital Holdings, 463 B.R. 142. 
48 In re Squire, 574 B.R. at 708. 
49 See id. 
50 See id. 
51 See In re Intervention Energy, 553 B.R. at 265 (“The federal public policy to be guarded here is to assure access 
to the right of a person, including a business entity, to seek federal bankruptcy relief as authorized by the 
Constitution and enacted by Congress.”). 
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never be forced to have their claims subjected to the bankruptcy process, they would ensure that 
with every loan given, they received a small amount equity in return.52 This would allow 
creditors an unfettered ability to deny bankruptcy access to potential debtors, directly 
contradicting the purpose of the bankruptcy code and federal public policy.53  
Conclusion 
“It is a well settled principal that an advance agreement to waive the benefits conferred 
by the bankruptcy laws is wholly void as against public policy.”54 In certain circumstances, such 
creditor/shareholder agreements have been permitted. However, these circumstances remain the 
exception, not the norm.55 A contrary policy would be unworkable, ultimately leading to the 
conclusion that “prohibition of preemption waiver has to be the law; otherwise, astute creditors 
would routinely require their debtors to waive.”56  
 
                                                
52 See id. at 264. 
53 See id. at 263. 
54 Id. 
55 See In re Franchise Services, 891 F.3d at 208; In re Global Ship Systems, LLC, 391 B.R. at 203. 
56 See Bank of China v. Huang, 275 F.3d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2002). 
